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Abstract 
The biomedical community is lagging in the adoption of cloud computing for the management of medical data. 
The primary obstacles are concerns about privacy and security. In this paper, we explore the feasibility of using 
advanced privacy-enhancing technologies in order to enable the sharing of sensitive clinical data in a public 
cloud. Our goal is to facilitate sharing of clinical data in the cloud by minimizing the risk of unintended leakage 
of sensitive clinical information. In particular, we focus on homomorphic encryption, a specific type of 
encryption that offers the ability to run computation on the data while the data remains encrypted. This paper 
demonstrates that homomorphic encryption can be used efficiently to compute aggregating queries on the 
ciphertexts, along with providing end-to-end confidentiality of aggregate-level data from the i2b2 data model.  
 
Introduction 
With the increasing digitalization of medical information, the ability to share data across clinical sites is 
indispensable in realizing the full promise of personalized medicine. Yet, because of privacy and security 
concerns, sharing clinical data across healthcare organizations is currently extremely difficult or impossible to 
realize. The number of data breaches is on the rise and there is significant public pressure1–3 for clinical sites to 
not share data stored in their repositories to ensure that patients’ information is adequately protected. As a result, 
the privacy risks associated with medical data sharing represent a real barrier to medical advancement, if 
effective privacy-preserving technologies are not adopted. 
Existing tools designed to enable collaborative medicine, such as Informatics for Integrating Biology and the 
Bedside (i2b2)4 and TranSMART5, lack the necessary security and privacy guarantees to be applied in untrusted 
environments. Their current deployments pose significant challenges in terms of both security (access control, 
accountability, data traceability) and privacy (trust management, confidentiality and resilience against inference 
attacks) that need to be addressed in order to reassure clinical sites and foster clinical data-sharing. The 
evolution of the regulation towards further guarantees (e.g., HIPAA in USA and the new GDPR in EU) also 
reflects these urgent needs.  
In the last few years, the IT security and privacy community has made substantial progress in the development 
of new sophisticated tools, also known as “privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs)”, that aim at responding to 
these needs. PETs provide strong security and privacy guarantees for the management of sensitive data6. Yet, 
due to the lack of awareness and their inherent complexity, the biomedical community has largely left PETs 
unutilized. So far, only a few isolated PETs-based systems have been deployed in medical operational settings7–
10. Therefore, it is essential to bridge this cultural gap, in order to address the privacy and security concerns 
affecting the medical community.  
This paper addresses this challenge by demonstrating the use of PETs in clinical environments. We explore the 
feasibility of using emerging technology for secure computation, specifically homomorphic encryption, for 
securely and privately sharing aggregate-level data from the most widespread data model for clinical research, 
notably i2b2. Particularly, we introduce a new model that efficiently uses homomorphic encryption to enable 
clinical sites to share i2b2 aggregate-level data with multiple researchers through an untrusted cloud provider 
without having to worry about potential leakages of sensitive information to untrusted third parties.  
i2b2 aggregate-level data consists of patient counts for unique combinations of location, ontology concept and 
time, e.g., the total number of patients at site Si that got “Type I Diabetes” observed in the first quarter of 2017. 
Although aggregate-level data is not directly identifying, sites willing to share the data by using a public cloud, 
are concerned about unintended leakages of sensitive information to untrusted third parties. For example, 
hospital-specific utilization patterns can reveal hospital operations and budgeting, and aggregates with small 
counts can reveal individual patients11. Indeed, the leakage of this information can severely damage sites’ 
reputation and jeopardize the privacy of their patients. Our solution ensures end-to-end protection of data 
confidentiality against any third party not in possession of the decryption key. Only a legitimate and authorized 
investigator can see the end result of a query while the confidentiality of the original data is always preserved. 
 
Informatics for Integrating Biology and the Bedside (i2b2) 
i2b2 is an open source clinical platform for enabling secondary use of electronic health records (EHR) used at 
over 150 clinical sites and covering more than 250 million patients’ records only in the US4. I2b2 is designed to 
enable investigators to perform queries on an enterprise data-repository in order to find sets of patients that 
would be of interest for further clinical research studies. It consists of a simple and flexible relational data-
model based on a “star schema” and a set of server-side software modules, called “cells”, which are responsible 
for the business logic of the platform and are organized in a “hive”. The data model stores, in a narrow table 
called “observation fact” table, clinical observations (or “facts”) about patients such as diagnoses, medications, 
procedures, and demographics, along with a date, a patient identifier and an encounter identifier. Each 
observation is encoded by an ontology concept from a medical terminology, such as the International 
Classification of Disease (ICD) or the US National Drug Code (NDC). The use of extendable ontologies makes 
i2b2’s model highly adaptable to site-specific coding and easily deployable on top of existing EHR systems. 
Besides the observation fact table, there are four other “dimension” tables that further describe patients’ data and 
meta-data. Queries are built in a Web-based query tool by combining ontology codes, organized in a 
hierarchical tree-based structure, with logical ORs and ANDs operators. i2b2 is supported by an active 
community and has become one of the most popular open-source prjects in health care research.  
 
Homomorphic Encryption 
Homomorphic encryption is a special form of public-key encryption that enables computations on encrypted 
values (see Figure 1). As with every public-key encryption scheme, it consists of two algorithms: an encryption 
algorithm and a decryption algorithm. Encryption and decryption can be seen as inverse operations. At one end, 
the encryption algorithm takes as input a plaintext message m and a public cryptographic key K and outputs a 
ciphertext c. On the other end, the decryption algorithm takes as input the ciphertext c and a secret 
cryptographic key k and outputs the original message m.  
In general, the public key K is derived from a secret key k in such a way that the inverse operation is not 
possible. We can say that an encryption scheme is secure if the ciphertext does not reveal any information about 
the underlying message to anyone without the secret key k or, similarly, if anyone without the secret key k is 
unable to distinguish an encryption of a message m0 from the encryption of another message m1.  


Data Model 
In order to store i2b2 aggregate-level data, we designed a data model that is fully compatible with the i2b2 data 
model and consists of a single table with three aggregating attributes and one counting attribute (see Table 1). 
Each row of this table stores the total number of patients for whom the same observation (unique combination of 
location, ontology concept and time) has been registered in the i2b2 observation fact table of any of the sites. In 
particular, the location column stores the information about the site at which the observation has been collected. 
The ontology concept column stores the unique identifier (e.g., concept code or concept path from the 
hierarchical ontology tree) of the condition, medication, lab result, or procedure that has been observed. The 
time column stores the time unit at which the observation has been collected, e.g., a particular month, quarter, 
year. Finally, the count column stores the total number of patients with the observation specified by the ontology 
concept X and collected at location Y and time Z. 
 
Table 1. Proposed data model storing i2b2 aggregate-level data. 
Patients Totalnum 
PK Location 
PK Ontology_Concept 
PK Time 
 Count 
 
This data model provides a high degree of flexibility as the three aggregating attributes can be defined at any 
spatial level, time scale and ontology concept of interest. Typical queries to this data model are of the form  
 
SELECT */SUM(count)  
FROM patients_totalnum  
WHERE (ontology_concept=X1 OR ontology_concept=X2 OR …) AND  
(location=Y1 OR location=Y2 OR …) AND (time=Z1 OR time=Z2 OR …)  
GROUP BY *; 
 
where Xi, Yi and Zi denote any possible value in the corresponding column. A concrete example of such queries 
could be: “What is the total number of patients per site that had been diagnosed with HIV in 2015?”. Our 
privacy-preserving model enables queries of this type on homomorphically encrypted data. 
 
Privacy-Preserving Data-Sharing Protocol 
The proposed privacy-preserving data sharing protocol is described in Figure 3 and it is based on the additively-
homomorphic properties of the EC ElGamal cryptosystem16.  
Initialization phase. We begin with the initialization phase. During this phase, the storage and the proxy servers, 
both equipped with a processing unit named “crypto engine”, independently generate a pair of asymmetric 
cryptographic keys (public and secret keys) for the EC ElGamal cryptosystem and combine their public keys to 
obtain a public shared key (black key in Figure 3). The two servers store their secret keys safely and do not 
exchange them with any other party in the system. 
 

depending on the trust level of the investigator, the storage server can then homomorphically add random 
Laplacian noise to obfuscate the query result and achieve differential privacy17,18 in order to mitigate the risk of 
re-identification of a patient in one of the sites’ databases.  
Finally, the (potentially obfuscated) result encrypted under the investigator’s public key is sent back to the 
investigator who can decrypt it by using his secret key (step 5 in Figure 3) and visualize the result. We note that 
the use of differential privacy implies that during the system initialization phase, each investigator is assigned a 
differential privacy budget “?” that is progressively reduced each time a new query is performed. When the 
budget is zero, the investigator cannot perform queries anymore. 
 
Results 
Prototype Implementation 
We implemented the proposed solution as a client-server application in the Go language (version 1.8)  by 
relying on the open-source ONet framework for decentralized and distributed protocols19. For the cryptographic 
operations in the privacy-preserving data-sharing protocol, we relied on the Go’s native cryptographic libraries 
and the ONet advanced cryptographic library19 that includes an implementation of the EC ElGamal on the 
Ed25529 elliptic curve12 with 128-bit security.  
The source code of our application is publicly available at https://github.com/JLRgithub/PDCi2b2. The client 
component enables the user to encrypt aggregate-level data extracted from the i2b2 data model and to specify 
the desired combination of aggregating attributes in order to query the encrypted data stored in a relational 
database system on the storage server. The server component enables to setup the storage and proxy servers, 
generate the cryptographic keys and execute the functionalities of the “crypto engine”, i.e., the homomorphic 
aggregation, the two party re-encryption protocol and the homomorphic obfuscation. 
 
Performance Evaluation 
We tested the performance of the proposed model in a real cloud-based environment. We set up the storage and 
proxy servers on two separated AWS instances both running 64-bit Linux Amazon-edition on a dual-core Intel 
Xenon E5645 processor with 2.40GHz frequency and 4GB RAM. Note that for an ideal deployment the two 
instances must be hosted by two different cloud providers in order to minimize the risk of collusion. We used an 
off-the-shelf laptop running Mac OS X on Intel Core i7 processor with 3.1GHz frequency and 16GB ram as the 
client machine. 
We simulated three different sites and, for each of them, we encrypted patients’ total numbers extracted from the 
i2b2 demo dataset. We considered only concepts in the lowest level of the ontology tree-based hierarchy, i.e., 
the leaves, and we used quarters as time unit. Patient counts for ontology concepts at higher levels in the tree-
based hierarchy can be obtained by recursively aggregating patient counts for the children concepts. Therefore, 
we used the concept path to uniquely identify each ontology concept in order to keep track of all the parental 
levels in the ontology tree. The resulting database had 10,767 rows per site for a total of 32,301 rows. We store 
the encrypted data in a PostgreSQL database on the storage cloud server.  
We measured the time of each cryptographic operation used in the privacy-preserving data-sharing protocol by 
averaging over 100 random queries for different levels of aggregations and different combinations of ontology 
concepts, times and locations. We used a single thread of execution in all of our experiments, not taking 
advantage of the available parallelism, to obtain a lower bound on the performance of the proposed system. 
Table 2 shows the amortized times obtained in our experiments. We note, however, that these operations are 
naturally parallelizable hence performance can be significantly improved. 
 
Table 2. Amortized times in milliseconds for the cryptographic operations run in the proposed privacy-
preserving data-sharing protocol. 
Cryptographic Operation Amortized Time per Record (ms) 
Homomorphic aggregation 0.004 
Proxy Re-Encryption 13.77 
Decryption 0.9 
 
Homomorphic aggregation scales linearly with the number of records that satisfy the querying criteria, whereas 
the re-encryption and the decryption operations scale linearly with the number of query results.  As an 
illustrative example, an aggregate query asking the total number of patients for whom any diabetes-related 
concepts have been observed in the first quarter of 2012 across all sites takes, on average, a total of 807 ms, 
where 214 ms is the time necessary to fetch the encrypted records satisfying the query (121 ontology concepts 
per site contain the keyword “diabetes” in their ontology path) from the database, 1.4 ms are used to 
homomorphically aggregate the records, 13 ms are used in the re-encryption protocol and 0.9 ms to decrypt the 
result. The remaining time, 576 ms, is the communication time between the client and the storage server 
necessary for sending the query and receiving the encrypted result, which was constant for all tested queries. 
Contrarily, a non-aggregate query that does not involve homomorphic aggregation, such as the total number of 
patients at site 1 for whom Diabetes Mellitus (ICD9:250) has been observed in the first quarter of 2012, takes 
only 590 ms in total (0.58 ms to fetch the record from the database, 13 ms for re-encryption, 0.9 ms for 
decryption and 576 ms for communication). 
 
Discussion 
In this paper, we demonstrated the feasibility of using homomorphic encryption in order to enable the sharing of 
i2b2 aggregate-level data through the cloud. We showed how this type of privacy-enhancing technology can be 
efficiently used to enable new use cases that are currently impossible due to technical or legal reasons, or need 
to rely on costly and time-consuming ethical and legal processes. Our solution introduces a new and simple 
model that minimizes the risk of unintended leakages of sensitive information by ensuring end-to-end 
confidentiality protection with respect to untrusted third parties. Results obtained in a basic testing environment 
are promising and show reasonable overhead especially from a computational point of view. The storage 
overhead is also practical as an encrypted database is only four times larger than its unencrypted version.  
Yet, it is important to mention that a main limitation of the proposed model is availability— both the cloud 
servers (storage and proxy servers) need to be online in order for the system to be operational. Although this 
might slow down adoption in an operational setting, replication can be used to mitigate this problem. Actually, it 
would be sufficient to replicate the number of instances of the same servers at the two cloud providers in order 
to guarantee service continuity: if one instance is unavailable, another one can immediately replace it.  
We emphasize on how the presence of two servers is necessary for the overall security of the system in order to 
achieve trust distribution and avoid a single point of failure in the system. If the cloud provider hosting the 
storage server was compromised, the data would still be secure because the attacker would need to also 
compromise the cloud provider hosting the proxy server in order to reconstruct the shared decryption key 
necessary to decrypt the data. Differently, if the security of the whole system was centralized on a single party 
(e.g., only on the storage cloud), it would be easier for the attacker to concentrate all his resources on a single 
target thus increasing the likelihood of jeopardizing the whole system. Intuitively, the larger the number of 
parties among which the trust is distributed (i.e., the number of proxy servers) the more secure is the system. 
Systems such as UnLynx20 or Sharemind21 rely on this idea. However, we believe that two independent servers 
can represent a practical and acceptable compromise between security and system usability. 
Moreover, we note that the encryption scheme used (EC ElGamal) is only additively homomorphic, hence it 
enables only linear aggregations in the encrypted domain (e.g., summations, counts). For more complex types of 
aggregation (e.g., correlations, linear regressions) a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, such as the FV 
encryption scheme22, that also enables multiplications on encrypted data can be used instead of EC ElGamal at 
the expense of an increased storage overhead, without modifying the proposed model. Although we used 
homomorphic encryption, there are other privacy-enhancing technologies that could also be used in this context. 
Secure computation is well supported also by garbled circuits23, as well as by linear secret sharing24. Yet, these 
two technologies require an increased level of interaction between the different parties than homomorphic 
encryption, thus resulting in even less reliable models from an operational perspective.  
In conclusion, the proposed solution based on homomorphic encryption has been shown to be efficient and 
secure in the semi-honest adversarial setting as sites’ sensitive data remains encrypted during the whole data-
sharing process. Only the investigator sending the query is able to decrypt the end result. In this paper, we did 
not address the case of a malicious active adversary who tampers with the data and the protocol in order to infer 
sensitive information as it would be in contrast with the business incentives of a cloud provider. Yet, we note 
that our model can be easily extended to this case in order to protect also the integrity of the data and the 
computations carried out in the cloud. Techniques such as zero-knowledge proofs of correctness25, can be added 
on top of our encryption scheme in order to ensure the integrity of the different steps of the data-sharing 
protocol and the identification of misbehaving parties at the expenses of an increased computational cost. These 
proofs can be securely stored on a distributed ledger, e.g., a blockchain, and be verified by any party in the 
system. We will consider this enhancement in future work. 
 
Conclusion 
Privacy and security concerns represent real obstacles for medical progress. Bridging the gap that still exists 
between the medical community and the IT security and privacy community is key for addressing this problem 
and making new and sophisticated privacy-enhancing technologies be core components of clinical operational 
tools in the near future. Although homomorphic encryption is still at an early point in its life cycle, there has 
been consistent, substantive, and rapid progress in making it practical from a performance standpoint. In this 
paper, we have shown that homomorphic encryption has enormous potential for enabling new use cases such as 
privacy-conscious sharing of i2b2 aggregate-level data in the cloud.  
The proposed model is generalizable and is not tied to i2b2 aggregate-level data. In future work, we will extend 
its functionalities so that also individual-level data from the i2b2 data model could be shared in the cloud in a 
privacy-preserving way thus making a further step towards the realization of personalized medicine to its full 
potential. 
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